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Abstract 
There is not enough empirical evidence about test of the semi-strong efficient hypothesis using newspaper 
publications.  In this paper, we investigate stock market reactions to news of accounting manipulation which 
are reported in newspapers.  Semi-strong efficient market hypothesis posits that stock prices quickly reflect all 
publicly available information, of which the newspaper is a part. Newspapers are a public source of information, 
and an important transmitter of news to the stock market.  The news of accounting manipulation that is 
published in newspaper can have repercussions on stock prices.  The purpose of the paper, therefore, is to 
investigate stock market reactions to news of accounting manipulation that is reported in the newspaper.  To 
test the semi-strong efficient hypothesis, we focus on newspaper reports of accounting manipulation from 36 
countries around the world.  We hypothesise that there are statistically significant differences between means of 
post- and pre-event day cumulative average abnormal stock returns of firms caught in accounting manipulation.  
Results of data analysed using events study methodology are consistent with our hypothesis. 
Keywords: Accounting manipulation, Cumulative abnormal stock return, Strong-form market efficiency, 
Efficient market hypothesis, Newspapers.  
 
1. Introduction    
There is not enough empirical evidence about the use of newspapers to test the semi-strong efficient market 
hypothesis.  This paper draws upon semi-strong efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970, 1991), which posits 
that stock prices quickly reflect all publicly available information. In this paper, we use newspaper reports of 
accounting manipulation from 36 countries around the world to test the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. 
In particular, we examine market reactions to news of accounting manipulation as published in newspapers.  
Newspapers are a public source of information, as they are an important transmitter of news to the stock market.  
Following Miller (2006) and Karpoff et al. (2008a, b), we track newspaper reports of accounting manipulation 
to examine market reactions to the published news.  Specifically, the paper investigates whether the stock 
market is semi-strong efficient regarding news of accounting manipulation that is available in the public 
domain through the newspaper.   
In this paper, we define accounting manipulation as a situation whereby the management of a firm acting 
opportunistically or efficiently misleads parties (other than themselves) by misrepresenting or misstating the 
firm’s earnings, financial position, cash flows, and other non-financial items.   There are other possible 
alternative sources of information such as the television, radio and news-wire which are likely to provide timely 
news about companies as well.  However, these alternative sources are transient and they are themselves likely 
to use the newspaper as one of their own news inputs.  For example, some major electronic news channels and 
television stations preview next morning’s newspapers the night before or early in the morning. Further, 
newspapers are comparably cheaper than other alternative sources we have mentioned.  Both individual and 
institutional investors still largely depend upon newspapers, unlike electronic sources which are mainly 
accessible to institutional investors because they can afford them, their apparent higher cost notwithstanding.  
There is possibility that newspaper reports can influence investors in their investment decision.  According to 
Fang & Peress (2009, p. 2023), “…every weekday, some 55 million newspaper copies are sold to individual 
readers in the United States, reaching about 20% of the nation’s population. If we consider online subscriptions 
and multiple readers per copy, the actual readership of the printed press is even larger, and certainly far broader 
than other sources of corporate information. Given (the) mass media’s broad reach, one might expect it to affect 
securities markets.”  Miller (2006, p. 1015) shows that the press is the first information intermediary to publicly 
identify accounting issues.  He asserts that up to 36% of caught cases of accounting malfeasance originated 
from reporter-generated information in daily newspapers.  Anecdotal evidence is consistent with the newspaper 
playing a pivotal role in news dissemination about companies to the capital market.  Also, a number of 
investment banks glean capital market information from newspaper publications.  According to the Financial 
Times, “From the tens of thousands of newspaper articles being analysed every day, MarketPsy builds a picture 
of investor feelings about 6,000 companies.1  Dow Jones publishes an economic sentiment index based on 
                                                           
1 MarketPsy, LLC is an investment firm based in the U.S.  See http://www.marketpsy.com/index.php 
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textual analysis of 15 U.S. newspapers, while investment banks measure everything from ratios of derivatives 
to the number of times the word “crisis” is used in the media.” 1   From the foregoing it can be said that 
newspapers are a very important source of public information about companies, so we expect that there are 
statistically significant differences between means of post- and pre-event day cumulative abnormal stock return 
of firms reported to have manipulated their account.  We analysed our hand-collected data using event study 
methodology and two other statistical techniques.  The results suggest that there are statistically significant 
differences between post- and pre-event day cumulative abnormal stock returns of firms reported to have 
engaged in accounting manipulation.    
Our paper contributes to the semi-strong efficient markets hypothesis literature by using, exclusively, 
newspaper reports of accounting manipulation.   The implication of our finding is that the capital market and 
investors around the world price news of accounting manipulation that is reported in newspapers.  This research 
has potential for future research.  It will be interesting in future to see whether the stock market is likely to price 
news of accounting manipulation that is published in the newspaper.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews related literature and presents the 
hypothesis of the paper.  Section 3 is the paper’s methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings while 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Review of related literature and hypothesis 
Semi-strong efficient market hypothesis posits that stock prices are most likely to react immediately to all 
publicly available information (see Fama et al. [1969], Fama [1970, 1980, 1991]).  This means that stock prices 
are likely to react negatively to unfavourable news.   Prior literature documents mixed evidence on information 
content of various kinds of news and events including stock splits, earnings announcements, release of non-
financial information, etc.  For example, Sah and Zhou (2012) use a sample of 37 announcements from fourth 
quarter 2008 till first quarter 2010 and find a mean negative abnormal return on the day of stock dividend 
announcement.  Ball & Brown (1968) seminal work provides one of the earliest evidences of the adjustment of 
stock prices to earnings announcements. Results presented by Ball & Brown (1968) demonstrate that 
information contained in annual accounting income numbers is useful in impounding stock prices.  They show 
that more than one-half of all the information about an individual firm which becomes available during a year 
is reflected in that year’s income number.  Ball & Brown (1968) conclude that the market reacts to earnings 
report releases even though most of the information contained in the reported income is anticipated by the 
market before the annual report is released.  Likewise, Beaver (1968, p. 74) finds that investors respond 
quickly to new pieces of information as reflected in changes in volume which were found to be low eight 
weeks prior to earnings announcement or report release.   Beaver’s (1968) finding indicates that greater volume 
and price activities take place in the week of earnings announcement than weeks prior to announcement.  
Brown & Warner (1985, 1980) also find that the stock market fully reflects information contained in news 
announcements almost immediately after the announcement date. Beneish (1999) documents evidence of a loss 
in stock prices of up to 21% following revelation of financial statements manipulation by managers.  Feroz et 
al. (1991) find that the market reacts negatively to news of firms under SEC investigation. Feroz et al. (1991, p. 
124) document a cumulative abnormal return of -6% for event days {-1, 0}.  Dechow et al. (1996) investigate 
market reactions to news that some firms are under SEC investigation for various accounting related issues.  
Their finding indicates that share prices reduced by 9%, on average.   Miller (2006) examines market reactions 
to alleged accounting malfeasance to gauge whether the market considers newspaper articles as providing new 
information.  Miller (2006) finds an average one-day market adjusted reaction of -6.3% and a-three-day market 
adjusted reaction of -8.20%.   Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) find evidence consistent with the view that the market 
penalises firms whose earnings manipulation is revealed in newspapers.  Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) find evidence 
of abnormal loss of various percentages (depending on the firm) on one day market return of trigger events that 
attract the attention of the SEC.  Benile & Jarrell (2009) investigate stock market reactions to the scandal 
surrounding stock options backdating in the U.S., which was reported in the Wall Street Journal.  They show 
that investors’ typical reaction to firm-specific backdating news is negative and significant, both economically 
and statistically.  Specifically, they report that the first trading day is associated with negative abnormal risk-
adjusted returns of around 7%. Benile & Jarrell (2009) attribute their result to the consistency of market 
efficiency.  Joy et al. (1977) report mixed results in their study of adjustment of stock prices to announcements 
of unanticipated changes in quarterly earnings.  Dichotomising between favourable and unfavourable 
announcement, they report small marginal price adjustments subsequent to an unfavourable announcement.  
Joy et al. (1977) study suggests that price adjustments to the information concerning security valuations 
contained in unexpected ‘highly favourable’ quarterly earnings reports are gradual, rather than instantaneous.   
                                                           
1 Quoted from Financial Times of London, July17/July 18 2010, page 21 
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LeRoy (1989) in a theoretical critique and rebuttal of the efficient market hypothesis reject efficient market 
hypothesis.  LeRoy (1989) adduced reasons for the failure of market efficiency including the joint-hypothesis 
problem, the high volume of trade on organised securities markets that pose a serious problem, the January and 
holiday effect on traded volumes.  Based on these reasons, LeRoy (1989) is led to conclude that, 
“However attractive… capital market efficiency is on methodological grounds; it is extraordinarily 
difficult to formulate nontrivial and falsifiable implications of capital market efficiency that are not in 
fact falsified” (LeRoy 1989, pp. 1614-15). 
It can be argued that when there is no newspaper reports of accounting manipulation to disturb equilibrium 
stock prices, post- and pre-event day stock prices are likely to be equal.   If the stock market is expected to be 
semi-strong efficient, then it follows that stock prices are likely to fall on publication of news of accounting 
manipulation in the newspapers.  Because of the information content of the news, it is expected that mean of 
post- and pre-event day cumulative average abnormal return will be different. Hence we state our hypothesis in 
the alternative form thus: 
H1:  There are statistically significant differences between the mean of post- and pre-event day      
        cumulative average abnormal stock return of firms reported to have manipulated their account.   
 
3.     Methodology  
3.1    Data collection and sample composition 
We relied entirely on published cases of the accounting manipulation in online newspapers to collect the 
research sample.  Prior researches have used newspapers to identify their sample (see, for example, Beneish 
[1997], Miller [2006], Klibanoff et al. [1998], Deschow et al. [1996], and Feroz et al. [1991]).    
Following the practice of prior researchers, we conducted detailed online media searches to identify the 
research sample.  Our online research sample search worked with the adopted definition of accounting 
manipulation (see this paper’s Introduction). 
We began with random online searches of news of accounting manipulation (or related topics as enumerated 
below).  Through www.onlinenewspaper.com, Dow Jones Factiva iWorks™ and infotrac we searched a 
number of online newspapers.  We also used search engines such as Google, and Yahoo!  These channels carry 
information about alleged cases of accounting manipulation, dates of publication and other pertinent details.   
The following keywords or their variants were used in the search: earnings management; accounting problem; 
earnings manipulation; financial misstatement; deceptive accounting; false accounting; fraudulent accounting; 
misleading accounting; inappropriate accounting; misstated earnings; spurious accounting; inflated earnings; 
inflated profits; overstated earnings; cooking the books; manipulated earnings; accounting fraud; accounting 
investigation; accounting probe; accounting restatement; understated profit; overstated profits; accounting 
scandals; accounting deficiencies; creative accounting; inaccurate financial statements; accounting irregularities; 
accounting errors; among other such related terms.   
When a hit comes up during the random search the story is read to determine whether it qualifies as accounting 
manipulation.  When we are satisfied that it so, the story is then traced to the original date of publication and 
the firm involved.  This process enabled the firm to be identified by name, and country.  We restricted our 
search to a number of English language newspapers from around the world.   Some of the selected titles of the 
newspapers include Financial Times of London, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The 
Washington Post, The Daily Mail of London, The Daily Telegraph of London, Thisday of Nigeria, The 
Evening Standard of London, The London Times, and DutchNews of Netherland.  Others include Kyodo News 
of Japan, the Japan Times, China Daily, The Moscow Times, Connexion of France, the Independent of London, 
Los Angeles Times, International Herald Tribune of France, The Philippine Star, Malaysia Today, The 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel of Canada, The Guardian of London, and of Nigeria, AFP of Germany, AD 
newspaper of Amsterdam, The Nation of Kenya, Globe and Mail of Canada, and many others.  On gaining 
access to a newspaper’s website, a word-search is carried out through its archives section or through an 
embedded search field.  Most of the newspaper searches returned a variety of hits.  There were instances where 
two or more newspapers published the same event. However, this posed little or no difficulty in identifying the 
first publication because dates and times are written in the masthead of newspapers.  In addition, some 
newspapers usually indicate whether or not the news is an update.  This helped in collecting the news as at the 
time it was first published, not on subsequent publications of the same news. Where an event is published by 
newspapers in more than one country, the date of first publication is reckoned with by choosing the newspaper 
that first published the news.  We did not find multiple publications of the same story in the same issue of a 
newspaper; if by chance we missed any, we did not control for this.  Tracing the news to its original date of 
publication is necessary, which requires that we be as precise as possible in capturing stock prices information. 
We used a combination of sources to collect stock prices data, including DataStream, Bloomberg, Google 
finance, Yahoo finance, AOL money and finance, BusinessWeek, as well as firms’ own websites that display 
historical stock prices data.  Stock market index data for the years 2000-2008 were extracted from stock 
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exchanges.  The following list of market indexes were consulted; the list is not exhaustive: S&P 500 (for firms 
listed in the US), S&P TSX Composite (covering Canada-listed firms), DAX (for firms listed in Germany), 
Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange Index (for firms listed in Malaysia), BEL-20 Composite Index (for firms listed 
in Belgium), FTSE 100 or FTSE- AllShare Index (for firms listed in the United Kingdom).  Others include 
OMX Stockholm 30 (covering firms listed in Sweden), All Ordinaries (for Australia-listed firms), CAC40 
Composite Index (covering France-listed firms), Han Seng Composite Index (covering Hong Kong-listed 
firms), Strait Times Composite Index (covering firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange). Others include 
Jakarta stock exchange composite index (for firms listed in Indonesia), KOSPI Composite index (covering 
firms listed in South Korea), Nikkie 225 Composite Index (covering Japan-listed firms), Taiwan Composite 
Index (for firms listed in Taiwan), Shanghai Composite Index (for China-listed firm), BSE Sensex Composite 
Index (covering firms listed in India).  In the absence of an active stock exchange from a firm’s home country, 
we go to the nearest stock exchange in the region or an alternative exchange where the firm is listed to collect 
data.  
3.2     Sample composition 
We are interested in alleged cases of accounting manipulation by listed firms covering the period 2000 up to 
August 2008, inclusive.  August 2008 is set as the cut-off date because of the financial crisis which was 
experienced in major free-market economies in the world.   The essay by Ball (2009, p. 1) supports this paper’s 
limiting itself to the period 2000 to 2008.  According to Ball (2009, p. 1), “the tsunami of accounting scandals 
at the beginning of the millennium is well known.”    
To be included in the sample, we required that all materials about a firm or country must be in English language 
or have English language version.  We found a total sample of 183 publicly quoted firms from 36 countries 
around the world where alleged cases of accounting manipulation were reported in newspapers.  Based on 
criteria listed in Table 1, we pruned down the 183 firms to 99.  We further deleted one of the firms because of 
being an outlier case).  This makes our analysis of stock prices to use a final sample of 98 firms. 1 
Table 1. Table showing composition of final research sample. 
Sample Composition 
  
Number 
 
% 
  Number of firms discovered to have manipulated their accounts 183 100 
 
  Number of firms delisted from an exchange during the period (11) (6) 
 
  Number of firms merged with or acquired by other firms (9) (5) 
 
  Number of firms without websites or whose information or   
  page cannot be found on a stock exchange’s website 
 
(23) 
 
(13) 
 
  Number of firms whose website is not in English (or their     
  English language translation is considered insufficient) 
 
(15) 
 
(8) 
 
  Number of firm qualified to be included in sample 125 68 
 
  Number of firms without stock quotes                                        (26) (14) 
 
  Number of firms qualifying for final sample 99 54 
 
Out of the183 firms originally identified, 125 (68%) firms’ data are useable. Eleven or (6%) were delisted from 
the stock exchanges, 9 (5%) were either merged or acquired by another company.2   Twenty-three or 13% of the 
firms had no website of their own and their information could not be found on the stock exchanges.  Fifteen (8%) 
of the firms had no English version of their web pages; and where an English web pages exist for them, it was 
                                                           
1 The sample size satisfies the central limit theorem, which requires that sample size (N) ≥ 30 can be considered adequate for 
meaningful statistical analysis. 
2 We cannot say whether the delisting of some of the firms from the sample introduces survivorship bias, the possibility exists.  
Attrition is due to a firm being delisted from an exchange, or merged with or acquired by other firms.   We do not attempt to 
control or account for survivorship bias.  Generally, reducing the sample size can only have the effect of reducing the 
explanatory power of the tests. 
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not inadequate. 
Consistent with prior research, banks and financial institutions are excluded from our analysis.   
3.3     Methods of analysing data    
Following prior literature, our test of the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis uses the widely accepted events 
study methodology (e.g., Sah & Zhou [2012], Campbell & Ohuocha [2011], Brown & Warner [1980], and 
DeFond & Jiambalvo [1994]) to capture market reactions to caught cases of accounting manipulation.  Fama 
(1970) posits that events studies are ways to directly test for market efficiency or information content of news 
event as a reduction in post abnormal stock returns is consistent with semi-strong-form market efficiency.  We 
follow Faccio et al. (2006), and Oppong’s (1980) approaches to calculate a thirteen-day (-6, 6) announcement 
period abnormal returns.  We are interested in daily event windows immediately following the news because 
daily stock returns are capable of ameliorating possible clustering effects associated with monthly, quarterly, 
weekly, or yearly stock returns.  We posit that daily stock returns immediately following publication of the news 
of accounting manipulation allow us to make inferences about the information content of the news, particularly 
as Brown & Warner (1980, p. 211) opine that in the absence of problems of non-normality and non-synchronous 
trading, all methods for measuring abnormal performance are potentially more powerful with daily data.  The 
authors also point to the fact that daily returns have smaller standard deviations than do returns of longer 
windows or intervals.  They argue that the power of all the methodologies increases with knowledge about 
precisely when an event occurred.  Hence, the “use of daily data is potentially useful in that it permits the 
researcher to take advantage of prior information about the specific day of the month on which an event took 
place.” In applying events study methodology, we examine changes in stock prices pre and post the publication 
day of the event.  We examine the event windows ranging from day -6 to day +6 (-6, 6) as we set the event day 
to zero.  Our choice of event window is arbitrary.  There is no theory that prescribes the choice of event windows.  
We note that there are upsides and downsides to various lengths of event windows. For example, a short window 
eliminates problems of clustering and reduces the effects of other extraneous variables that are not related to 
accounting manipulation, but which may impact on data of a wider window. According to Balsam et al. (2002, p. 
1001, footnote 13), the choice of a very wide window will reduce the statistical power of a test whereas a very 
short window will fail to capture stock prices reaction sufficiently, which can lead to insignificant results.  
Reasonable and short windows allow news of accounting manipulation to be immediately impounded throughout 
the market.    
Modified market model 
The modified market model is derived from the stochastic version of the capital asset pricing model of Sharp 
(1963) and Lintner (1965).  In this paper, we follow Fuller et al. (2002), Ross et al. (2002, p. 351) and Brown & 
Warner (1980) in using the modified market model to specify abnormal stock returns, ARi,t, which is assumed 
normal, independent and identically distributed.  Expected mean of the event day abnormal stock return, Ε(ARi,0) 
= 0.  
The following equations and definitions used in this study are to be noted, beginning with: 
Abnormal stock return, AR1: 
ARi,t-n  =  Ŕi,t-n   ─   Μi,t-n                                 (1.a)  
ARi,t+n =  Ŕi,t+n   ─   Μi,t+n                        (1.b) 
Where:   (1.a) is to the left of day 0 and (1.b) is to the right of day 0.  As mentioned earlier, day 0 is the event day. 
ARi,t-n = abnormal stock return for firm i on day t.  ARi,t-n is cumulated over a six-day period, to the left of day 0, 
event day;  i.e., days -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1 
ARi,t+n = abnormal stock return for firm i on day t.  ARi,t+n is cumulative over a six-day period, to the right of day 
0, the event day; i.e., days +6, +5, +4, +3, +2, +1 
Ŕi,t-n  = realised stock return of firm i on day t.  Ŕi,t-n is cumulated over a six-day period, to the left of day 0, event 
day; i.e., days -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1 
Ŕi,t+n = realised stock return of firm i on day t. Ŕi,t+n is cumulated over a six-day period, to the right of day 0, 
event day; i.e., days +6, +5, +4, +3, +2, +1 
Μi,t-n = realised market index stock return of country i where firm i is listed on day t.  Μi,t-n is cumulated over a 
six-day period, to the left of day 0, event day; i.e., days -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1 
Μi,t+n = realised market index stock return  of country i where firm i is listed on day t.  Μi,t+n is cumulated over a 
six-day period, to the right of day 0, event day; i.e., days +6, +5, +4, +3, +2, +1 
Cumulative abnormal stock returns, CAR, is the summation of abnormal stock returns for firm i on day t, to the 
                                                           
1 We use a true return generating process to calculate abnormal stock return, AR, by subtracting realised daily stock return of 
the market index of the country where a firm is listed from the firm’s daily stock return around the event window.  That is,   
AR = [(p1 – p0) / p0] – [(M1 – M0) / M0]; where, respectively, the first and second term on the right is the daily returns of a 
single firm and market daily index return. Returns are calculated here as price relatives. 
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left and right of day 0: 
        Ʃ(ARi,t-n  =  Ŕi,t-n  
     Ʃ(ARi,t+n =  Ŕi,t+n  
 
Cumulative average abnormal stock returns for all firms
return, (ƩARi,t-n, ƩARi,t+n) by N, the final 98 sample firms; to the left or right of day 0; that is, 
Ʃ(ARi,t-n = Ri,t-n - Mi,t-n) / 98
Ʃ(ARi,t-n = Ri,t-n - Mi,t-n) / 98
 
Operationalising equations (3.a) and (3.b) produces Graph 1, which shows the static cumulative average 
abnormal stock return for all firms. 
Another type of cumulative average abnormal stock return calculated in this paper is exp
i’s day zero stock price, Pi,t-0, and market index stock return on 
calculating realised abnormal stock return. 
Firm i’s stock price of any of the days in our ±6 day window, 
window are used as numerators in calculating realised abnormal st
rolling or “day-on-day” basis because the numerator changes each day.   That is,             
                           ∑ ARi,j                         
      CAAR(98)   =  ———    =      ∑        
                               98                                  
Hence equation (4) neutralises cumulative abnormal stock return of event 
2.  We calculated the “day-on-day” or “rolling” cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, for a
window: t-5 to t+6. We could not calculate the CAAR for day six before the news was published in the 
newspapers because to do so would require stock prices data of the seventh day before the news; our event 
window does not cover day seven before the news. Hence, as Graph 2 shows, we have a
CAAR. Compare equation (4) to the one in footnote 5 and
    
4.  Empirical Findings 
We compare CAAR of day zero, publication day, against CAAR in our event window, to the left or to the right.  
The stationary CAAR shown in Graph 1 indicates CAAR of 11.21%, 9.63%, 10.03%, 9.38%, 9.2
for day -6 to -1, respectively.  It can be seen that CAARs to the left of day 0 are positive but declining in 
magnitude as the day inches closer to the event day.  After the news is published CAARs become negative.  For 
example, CAAR is -3.81%, -5.06%, 
 
                     Graph 1. Graph of Stationary Average Abnormal Returns over a thirteen
In Graph 1, the areas under and above 0.0, on 
can be seen from the graph that after the news CAAR falls below 0.0 (becomes negative) post
shaded area of CAAR pre-event day is above 0.0 on the 
stock market is, indeed, semi-strong efficient with respect to news of accounting manipulation that is published 
in newspapers.  Specifically, CAAR is at its lowest decline ever on day 0.  Indeed, no CAAR before that day
as low as that of day zero and one day after the news (i.e., t+1).   Days 0 and +1 were days that stock markets 
Graph 1 Data 
Days AAR (%) 
-6 11.21 
-5 9.63 
-4 10.03 
-3 9.38 
-2 9.24 
-1 8.04 
0 0 
1 -3.81 
2 -5.06 
3 -5.60 
4 -5.91 
5 -4.20 
6 -3.38 
 
                                          
) 
38 
─ Μi,t-n)                              
─ Μi,t+n)                  
, is obtained by dividing the summed up abnormal stock 
       
       
lained as follows:  Firm 
day zero, Ḿi,t-0, are used as denominators in 
 
Pi,t, and the market index, Ḿ
ock return.  It should be noted that this is on a 
 
Pi,t ─ Pi,t-0       Ḿi,t ─ Ḿi,t-0                      
————   ̶   ————     /  98     
Pi,t-0                 Ḿi,t-0 
day to zero, and this is shown in Graph 
 the difference will be clear. 
-5.60%, -5.91%, -4.20%, and -3.38% for day +1 through +6, respectively.
-day window.
the y axis, and day 0, on the x axis, are shaded for visual clarity.  It 
y axis.  Evidence presented in Graph 1 suggests that the 
                 www.iiste.org 
 (2.a) 
 (2.b) 
 
 (3.a) 
 (3.b) 
i,t, of the same 
  (4)     
-twelve-day 
-twelve-day rolling 
4%, and 8.04% 
 
                     
 
-event day.  The 
 is 
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quickly reflected the news publication.  In Graph 2 CAAR begins to rally as from day t+1, which is negative (
2.90%); but not up to the levels of those on the left side of day zero, days t
day four after the news and then began another round of descent from day t+5.  It tumbled to 0.23% on day t+6.   
The rise in CAAR from day t+1 onwards is indicative that a
the news began to fizzle out such that its negative impact begins to fade away.  It can be noticed that CAAR 
begins to rise as from day t+2 and day t+4, only to tumble again on day t+5 and t+6, an anoma
the scope of this research. 
Furthermore, in Graph 2, event day CAAR is 
0.48%, -0.85%; respectively for day 
 
                     Graph 2. Graph of “Rolling” Average Abnormal Returns over a twelve
Comparing any of these CAAR to the event day CAAR, it can be seen th
the event day, day 0, by witnessing the greatest fall in stock prices.  Post
is -2.90%, -0.97%, -0.61%, 1.30%, 0.73%, and 0.23%.  Again, in absolute terms, no CAAR is as large a
day 0; evidence that stock prices immediately impound all publicly available news. It is interesting to see the 
sharp turning point of CAAR between day 
we find a weak positive abnormal return (from 
some optimistic market reaction. 
Our preliminary result is generally consistent with those reported by Bernile & Jarrell (2009) who find a 
statistically significant negative (-7%) abnormal stock returns on the first day of announcement of firm
backdating allegations in the press.  The result is also in accord with Miller (2006) who finds day zero (and a 
three-day) stock reaction to be up to 
with Beneish (1999) who documents evidence of a rapid and immediate price adjustment subsequent to 
unfavourable news about a company.   Beneish (1999) documents evidence of a loss in stock price of up to 21
following revelation of financial statements manipulation by managers.  Finally, our result is consistent with Sah 
& Zhou (2012) who find a mean negative abnormal return of 
announcement.  
4.1    Parametric t-tests 
We perform a-two sample parametric t
difference between the mean of post
assumes normality of data and equality of sample variances for pre
test is shown in Table 2.    Consistent with expectation, the mean of pre
mean of post-event day CAAR (-4.96).  The difference (14.86
either a parametric t-test or a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank
reacts to newspaper reports of accounting manipulation by the reduction in post
tailed). This t-test supports the alternative hypothesis, 
between means of post- and pre-event day cumulative average abnormal returns, which is due to stock prices 
impounding news of accounting manipulation.  
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-5 -1.26 
-4 0.74 
-3 -0.46 
-2 -0.48 
-1 -0.85 
0 -6.25 
1 -2.90 
2 -0.97 
3 -0.61 
4 1.30 
5 0.73 
6 0.23 
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s the days on the right-hand side of day zero went by 
-6.25%.  CAAR before the event day is 1.26%, 0.74%, 
-5 through -1.  
at the market reacts very negatively on 
- event CAAR, excluding that of day 0, 
-1 and 0 in Graphs 1 and 2.  Further, following the publication day, 
-6.25% to -2.9%) on the day after that (+1), which may convey 
-6.30% and (-8.20%), respectively.   Further, our result is also consistent 
-1.23 percent on the day of stock dividend 
-test to test the alternative hypothesis that there is statistically significant 
- and pre- event day cumulative average abnormal stock returns. The t
- and post-event day CAAR.
- event CAAR (9.9) is higher than the 
) is statistically significant at the .001 level using 
-sum test. We therefore conclude that the market 
-event day CA
H1, that there is a statistically significant difference 
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  The result of the 
AR (p < 0.001, 2-
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and two-sample t-tests (mean different from mid-point of 0) 
  ƩARi,t-n ƩARi,t+n Difference in mean CAAR 
Mean 9.90 -4.96              14.86 
Variance 328.85 178.64  
Standard deviation 105.18 80.16  
Observations 98 98  
Pooled Variance 253.74   
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0.00   
df 194   
t Stat 6.53   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00   
t Critical two-tail 1.97    
ƩARi,t-n = pre-event day, day 0, cumulative abnormal stock return 
ƩARi,t+n = post-event day, day 0, cumulative abnormal stock return 
     Table 2 showing the result of parametric t-test. 
4.2      Additional non-parametric t-tests 
As a robustness check, we performed two additional non-parametric tests.  These are the Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test and Sign Test.  These additional tests is to determine whether the result is driven by the two-sample 
parametric t-test.  The test results are presented in Table 3, Panel A (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test) and Panel B 
(Sign test).    
Table 3.  Table presenting results of non-parametric t-tests 
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Pre-event day CAAR – Post-event day CAAR 
Panel A.  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Panel B.  Signed Test 
    Z -7.007c -6.364c 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
     c Based on negative ranks. 
   a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
    b Sign Test 
Consistent with the results reported in the sections above, both tests indicate that the difference between the 
medians of pre- and post-event day CAAR is statistically significant, see Panel A and Panel B.  The z-value of 
Wilcoxon Test is -7.007 whereas that of Signed Test is -6.364, both with Asymp. Sig. ρ-value (2-tailed) = 0.000.  
Taken together, the tests performed in this paper suggest that post- and pre-event day cumulative abnormal 
returns are different from each other due to newspaper reports of accounting manipulation.   
 
5.    Conclusion 
This paper examined market reaction to news of accounting manipulation based on newspaper reports of the 
event from 36 countries around the world. The paper draws upon the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. 
The semi-strong efficient market hypothesis posits that stock prices quickly reflect all publicly available 
information. The paper’s objective was to investigate whether the market reacts to newspaper reports of 
accounting manipulation.   We used events study methodology for our test.  We applied parametric and non-
parametric statistical techniques to test the hypothesis that there are significantly differences between the means 
of post- and pre-event day cumulative average abnormal returns.  Consistent with our expectation, the 
documented evidence suggests that there are statistically significant differences between the means of post- and 
pre- event day cumulative average abnormal stock returns which can be attributable to the information content of 
the news of accounting manipulation. We show that cumulative average abnormal returns are at their lowest the 
day the news of accounting manipulation is published in newspapers. The result is robust to alternative tests. 
Our paper contributes to the semi-strong efficient markets hypothesis literature by using, exclusively, newspaper 
reports of accounting manipulation.   The implication of our finding is that the capital market and investors 
around the world price news reported in newspapers.   The implication of the finding is that investors still rely on 
newspaper reports to price stocks.   
This research has potential for future research.  It will be interesting in future to gauge whether there is 
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information content of newspaper publication of news of accounting manipulation.  
5.1   Caveat 
This study is based entirely on newspaper reports of accounting manipulation from 36 countries around the 
world.  One might question whether the newspaper is relevant to investors in their investment decision making 
process, especially given that there are other sources of information like the television, radio and others.  In the 
course of our study, we pointed to anecdotal as well as research evidences that suggests that most reliable 
electronic media use the newspaper as one of their own sources of news.  Therefore, the newspaper is still 
relevant to investors today.    
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